No.

13

2023
Empires, Nation-States and Democracies
Gérard Roland

The international order in historical perspective

In this paper, the author analyzes different political regimes (empires, nation-states, and democracies) in a number of institutional and economic dimensions: tendency towards geographical expansionism or fragmentation, cultural heterogeneity, focus of public spending, and a number of other variables. He uses this setup to analyze the coexistence and interactions between empires, nation-states, and democracies. While these interactions are source of instability, he argues that modern economic development tends to doom empires that were once the dominant form of political regime in history.

In this paper, the author analyzes different political regimes (empires, nation-states, and democracies) in a number of institutional and economic dimensions: tendency towards geographical expansionism or fragmentation, cultural heterogeneity, focus of public spending, and a number of other variables. He uses this setup to analyze the coexistence and interactions between empires, nation-states, and democracies. While these interactions are source of instability, he argues that modern economic development tends to doom empires that were once the dominant form of political regime in history.

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Comparing characteristics of empires, nation-states, and democracies

The table summarizes in a comparative perspective the main characteristics of empires, nation-states, and democracies as discussed in this paper. These are indeed only ideal types, but their differences are quite noteworthy, be it in terms of differences in the tendency towards expansionism, the nature of their ethnic mix and ideology, the focus of public expenditures, domestic defense capacity, openness to immigration and a number of economic variables such as openness to trade and FDI and the sources of growth. Note that nation-states are particularly vulnerable to secessions, because oppressed minorities living in particular territories will benefit from seceding to avoid oppression. Both empires and democracies are better at accommodating such moves for different reasons. Empires are able to accommodate coexistence of different ethnic groups. It is less the case for democracies, but they have the flexibility of changing political institutions to accommodate whenever possible secessionist tendencies related to ethnic diversity.

The table summarizes in a comparative perspective the main characteristics of empires, nation-states, and democracies as discussed in this paper. These are indeed only ideal types, but their differences are quite noteworthy, be it in terms of differences in the tendency towards expansionism, the nature of their ethnic mix and ideology, the focus of public expenditures, domestic defense capacity, openness to immigration and a number of economic variables such as openness to trade and FDI and the sources of growth. Note that nation-states are particularly vulnerable to secessions, because oppressed minorities living in particular territories will benefit from seceding to avoid oppression. Both empires and democracies are better at accommodating such moves for different reasons. Empires are able to accommodate coexistence of different ethnic groups. It is less the case for democracies, but they have the flexibility of changing political institutions to accommodate whenever possible secessionist tendencies related to ethnic diversity.

Characteristics of empires, nation-states, and democracies. Source: Roland (2023)
Characteristics of empires, nation-states, and democracies. Source: Roland (2023)

Conclusion

The coexistence of empires, nation-states and democracies is problematic and is likely to lead to instability. One of the key messages of this paper is that it is important to understand the nature of each country’s regime in order to understand its external and internal behavior.

Whereas empires were dominant in most of world history since the emergence of states, they have been declining strongly since the 20th century and with the advent of nation-states and democracies. Remaining empires should further decline in the future. The Russian empire is much smaller and weaker than the Soviet empire in all dimensions. It will further weaken economically and demographically. The Chinese empire is in expansion mode but is facing huge costs of maintaining the empire in the provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan and Ningxia, among others. Moreover, the costs of invasion by communist empires are higher than for traditional empires given the need to install communist party cells throughout the fabric of society. Absorbing Hong Kong after the National Security Law is proving very costly. Absorbing Taiwan may prove to be a tipping point. China is still militarily quite inferior to the US and is facing major demographic challenges as the “one child” policy has led to a rapid aging of the population.

A world of small democracies building supranational institutions to regulate their relations on the basis of commonly accepted rules and threats from empires seems, in the authors’ view, to be the path for the distant future. He emphasizes the advantage of smallness, because democracies tend to split due to secessionist internal tendencies and also because large powerful democracies like the US that acted like empires in the past may still face imperial temptations, in the face of flaws of their democratic system. The election of Trump, a would-be dictator, has done a lot of damage to US democracy, and one cannot exclude a crisis of US democracy and forms of creeping authoritarianism. Moreover, a part of the US elite still favors using its power to bully other countries. The other democratic country of a major size is India. India has been a relatively well-functioning democracy since its independence in 1947. It faced authoritarian tendencies under Indira Gandhi, in particular with the state of exception between 1975 and 1977, but the biggest challenge to India’s democracy came in recent years from Prime Minister Modi who is trying to turn India into a kind of a nation-state based on Hinduism, with Muslims being discriminated against. India is still too poor to behave like an empire and Modi’s Hindu nationalism does not (as yet) favor a willingness to invade neighboring Bangladesh and Pakistan.

The European Union is a good example of a supranational institution regrouping midsize and small countries. It has been functioning relatively well in the economic sphere, but has depended so far on the US for its military protection. While small democracies will continue facing empires in the foreseeable future, it will be vital for them to create multilateral commitment devices to defend each other. This will be particularly important given the tendency of democracies towards appeasement when other democracies are under attack. NATO can provide such a multilateral commitment device provided European countries play a larger role in the alliance. Multilateral commitment can be created not only by written commitments, such as Article 5 of NATO considering an attack on one NATO country to be an attack on all NATO countries, but also by concrete steps such as having NATO troops of all member countries present on the territory of each member state.

The coexistence of empires, nation-states and democracies is problematic and is likely to lead to instability. One of the key messages of this paper is that it is important to understand the nature of each country’s regime in order to understand its external and internal behavior.

Whereas empires were dominant in most of world history since the emergence of states, they have been declining strongly since the 20th century and with the advent of nation-states and democracies. Remaining empires should further decline in the future. The Russian empire is much smaller and weaker than the Soviet empire in all dimensions. It will further weaken economically and demographically. The Chinese empire is in expansion mode but is facing huge costs of maintaining the empire in the provinces of Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan and Ningxia, among others. Moreover, the costs of invasion by communist empires are higher than for traditional empires given the need to install communist party cells throughout the fabric of society. Absorbing Hong Kong after the National Security Law is proving very costly. Absorbing Taiwan may prove to be a tipping point. China is still militarily quite inferior to the US and is facing major demographic challenges as the “one child” policy has led to a rapid aging of the population.

Author

E. Morris Cox professor of economics and professor of political science at the University of California Berkeley
Prof. Gérard Roland

Gérard Roland is the E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of more than 100 journal articles, books, and book chapters, and has focused in particular on the impact of culture and political institutions on the prosperity of countries. A native of Belgium, he is intimately familiar with the challenges of small nations and federalism. In his presentation, he will focus on the rise of China and the changing world order. Professor Roland has worked as a consultant for the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Commission and the Inter-American Development Bank.

E. Morris Cox professor of economics and professor of political science at the University of California Berkeley
Prof. Gérard Roland

Gérard Roland is the E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of more than 100 journal articles, books, and book chapters, and has focused in particular on the impact of culture and political institutions on the prosperity of countries. A native of Belgium, he is intimately familiar with the challenges of small nations and federalism. In his presentation, he will focus on the rise of China and the changing world order. Professor Roland has worked as a consultant for the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Commission and the Inter-American Development Bank.